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Abstract 
Recent studies on Eastern European migration argue that moving for self-development reasons is becoming 
increasingly common among this group. Furthermore, it is suggested that migration from the East is 
becoming individualised and less dependent on social surroundings. Nevertheless, most such results rely 
on interviews conducted among certain social groups, such as the young and highly skilled. Hence, the 
comparison between diff erent social groups and their motivations is rarely provided and, therefore, the 
claims about increased individualisation might be premature. This article uses the Estonian Household 
Module Survey, including responses from 620 Estonians intending to migrate, to evaluate if migration 
fl ows are indeed becoming more individualised and less dependent on social surroundings. Using cluster 
analysis, three diff erent groups — self-development, economic and life quality migrants — are formed, 
which are then tested using regression analysis to check for the infl uence of socio-demographic variables. 
The article concludes that socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, family status and 
socio-economic status are still relevant for migration intentions. Indeed, a new group of Eastern European 
migrants, mainly oriented towards self-development, is emerging; however, it is small and consists mostly 
of young, Estonian-speaking females. The results complicate the notions of free mobility and liquid 
migration from Eastern Europe and illustrate that there is a need to pay attention to the increasing group 
diff erences in these societies.
Keywords: migration motives, individualization, Eastern Europe.
Introduction
Recent research on Eastern European migration has suggested that new mobility patterns are 
emerging. Instead of the stereotypical migrant, male and low skilled, looking for ways to accumulate 
money before returning to the home country (Drinkwater, Eade, & Garapich, 2009; Engbersen, 
Leerkes, Grabowska-Lusinska, Snel, & Burgers, 2013; Parutis, 2014), we see more and more highly 
skilled migrants that are interested in self-development, new cultural experiences, etc. Such mobility 
patterns have been related to the individualisation of these societies as well as to the prevalence 
of post-materialist values. Sommers and Woolfson (2014), on the contrary, claim that instead of 
the prevalence of post-materialist values, many people from the Baltics are motivated by economic 
troubles. The results from diff erent studies on Eastern European migration are indeed contradictory 
on the main motivation of migrants. This might be because the migration currents from Eastern 
Europe are becoming diversifi ed and more complex (Burrell, 2012; Engbersen et al., 2013; Morokvasic, 
2004). However, apart from acknowledging the versatility, there has been very little eff ort to describe 
and explain such diversifi ed migration fl ows.
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This article departs from the question of whether the versatility of migration motives of Eastern 
Europeans can be explained by their varying social background. Due to the qualitative nature of current 
research focusing on Eastern European migration and motivations, we lack suffi  cient comparative 
data on the diff erences between social groups (Engbersen et al., 2013). Such discrepancies make it very 
diffi  cult to understand the motivations of migrants in a more generalised manner, instead of focusing 
on individual stories. Hence, it is also very diffi  cult to control for the individualisation of migration 
fl ows, since diff erent social groups and their migration motives are rarely compared. However, the 
claims on the individualisation of migration from Eastern Europe cannot be made solely based on the 
young and highly skilled.
This article analyses the connection between diff erent migration motives (intended) and socio-
demographic variables. It uses quantitative data from the Estonian Household Module survey from 
2008, which asked people if they intended to migrate and if so, for what reasons. Among 5500 
respondents, 620 intended to move. The results will be analysed, fi rst to determine the infl uence 
of socio-demographic characteristics on migration motives, then using cluster analysis to identify 
diff erent groups based on migration motives, and fi nally employing regression analysis to determine 
if socio-demographic characteristics have any infl uence on determining to which group an individual 
belongs.
Estonia provides a good case for the study for numerous reasons: the extent of migration from the 
country, the rapidly increasing inequalities in the society, the prevalence of neoliberalist discourse, 
and proximity to the Western (Northern) societies. The aforementioned factors bring together the high 
emphasis on individualist and materialist values, increasing economic disparities, the strong stress 
put on individual responsibility for one’s economic wellbeing, and the proximity of potential places of 
exit. In a way, the country illustrates the cleavage present in most Eastern European societies, which 
so far has been mainly overlooked by migration studies.
The changing nature of Eastern European migration
Migration from Eastern Europe has traditionally been related to economic motives. However, several 
scholars have recently criticised such stereotypical representation of Eastern European migration 
(Black, Engbersen, & Okólski, 2010; Ciupijus, 2011; Burrell, 2010). Especially young and highly skilled 
Eastern Europeans are suggested to be part of a new generation of mobile Europeans for whom moving 
abroad is not only work-related but also involves lifestyle choices as part of a broader aspiration 
for self-development (Black, Engbersen, & Okólski, 2010; Krings, Bobek, Moriarty, Salamońska, & 
Wickham, 2013). Such changes have been connected with the transformations in these societies, such 
as individualisation, the introduction of the free EU mobility space, the increase in post-materialist 
values, and the importance of the project of the refl exive self. Overall, it is suggested that individuals 
no longer fi t into traditional categories such as family or class, but are forced to engage in refl exive 
decision-making about their lives. Mobility is part of such refl exive decision-making, as fl exibility 
becomes a requirement for the individuals in the second modernity. According to Engbersen, Snel, & 
Boom (2010), many migrants postpone marriage and having children, moving when they are single 
and have few family obligations.
Still, some argue that in addition to self-development related motives, Eastern Europeans do 
migrate with their families for the purpose of improving their family’s livelihood. In fact, Botterill 
(2014) criticised research on Eastern European migration for focusing only on the experiences of 
young, single people, often with an emphasis on patterns of individualised mobility as characteristic 
of post-accession migration. Both Botterill (2014) and McGhee, Heath, & Trevena (2012) argued that 
securing a livelihood for one’s family and living an economically more secure and sustainable life has 
been a concern for many Polish migrants. Drinkwater et al. (2009) have suggested that the category of 
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A8 (new accession countries) migrant worker needs to be questioned. According to them, A8 migrants 
engage in diverse migration strategies that encompass a range of movements from short-term 
movements linked to specifi c working contracts through to permanent settlement. Furthermore, 
Trevena, Glorious, Grabowska-Lusinska, and Kuvik (2011) have developed three diff erent categories 
of Eastern European migrants: target earners, whose main objective is to accumulate enough money 
for the purpose of investing in their home country; career-seekers, who wish to develop their career 
abroad; and fi nally drifters, who pursue goals other than professional advancement or saving for 
investment.
Nevertheless, most studies that aim to describe diff ering migration motives among Eastern 
European migrants are qualitative. Even though these studies provide a valuable contribution to 
understanding the versatility of diff erent migrants groups, what is currently lacking is a comprehensive 
overview of the social background of these dissimilar migrant groups (see also Engbersen et al., 
2013). Although there is evidence that motives of Eastern European migrants diff er, we are left in the 
dark as to why such diff erences have emerged. Furthermore, if Eastern European migration has in 
fact individualised, such diff erences might not be explainable by the diff erent social background of 
these people. However, in order to check whether that is really the case, we would need to test the 
connection between migration motives and social characteristics.
As most of the research has favoured the theory on free mobility, there is little data on how socio-
demographic variables infl uence current migration motives. Cook, Dwyer, & Waite (2011) suggested 
that the experiences of Eastern European migrants are more complicated than currently stated 
and depend on factors such as gender, ethnicity, qualifi cations, language, skills, etc. In migration 
research, the former biography has been mainly stressed by contextualist research on the 90s and 
currently by lifestyle migration research, which argues that the middle class is being increasingly 
characterised by new mobility patterns. In addition, there has been an assumption that the highly 
skilled tend to move for career advancement and cultural enrichment, whereas the low skilled 
generally consider economic factors more important (Conradson & Latham, 2005; Kennedy, 2010). 
When it comes to gender diff erences in migration patterns, several researchers have criticised the 
underlying assumption that women would mostly move for family reasons (Bilsborrow & Schoorl, 
2006; Kofman, 2000). Furthermore, there is a lack of studies on how ethnicity infl uences migration 
motives. Only Aptekar (2009) and Cook et al. (2011) have noted that in addition to economic reasons, 
minorities (Russian speakers in Estonia and Roma) tend to move because of discrimination in the 
sending countries. Finally, there are no studies on how family status infl uences migration motives. 
Most of the aforementioned studies focus on Western European migrants; however, due to 
the rapid changes following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the impact of socio-demographic 
variables on migration motives might diff er signifi cantly in these societies. In addition, Horváth (2008) 
has stressed that it is important to consider values as potential drivers of migration, and several 
studies have illustrated that in Eastern European countries only the younger generation is infl uenced 
by post-materialist values that are so common in the West (Drinkwater et al., 2009). However, the 
research focusing on Eastern Europeans and the infl uence of socio-demographic variables on their 
motives is qualitative (Engbersen et al., 2013). Hence, there is very little comparative material on how 
variables such as gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, family status and age infl uence migration 
patterns from Eastern Europe.
However, studying migration patterns, specifi cally migration motivations, is a daunting task not 
the least due to the fact that we can either study those who intend to migrate or the actual migrants. 
In both cases, the motives that are stated might depart from the motives at the moment of migrating. 
If we are to study those who have migrated, the motives stated at the moment of survey might vary 
from the motives at the time of migration. On the other hand, if we study those who intend to migrate, 
our study might include migrants who never carried out their plans. In this article, I have chosen 
to study migration intentions and, hence, will add some comments on the relationship between 
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migration intentions and the actual migration. A growing number of academics have started to use 
migration intentions as approximations of actual migration; however, more research is needed on the 
match between the two (see van Dalen & Henkens, 2008). According to Castaldo, Litchfi eld, & Reilly 
(2005), migration intentions provide information on whether the individual has considered migrating, 
therefore, these individuals could be considered as predisposed towards migrating. However, scholars 
have also found that there are gaps between intended and actual migration (see Krusell, 2009); not 
everyone who intends to migrate actually does so. Gordon & Molho (1995) have found that among 
internal migrants who had intentions of moving, 90% did so within fi ve years. Böheim & Taylor (2002) 
showed that those respondents who express an intention to move are three times more likely to 
move than those not expressing any intention. Finally, van Dalen & Henkens (2008) found that 24% of 
those intending to move had done so within two years of the interview; however, they suggest that 
more respondents probably did subsequently migrate. Such varying results might, of course, lead to 
potential problems in using motives of intentions as proxies for understanding migration behaviour. 
However, one can hypothesise that migration intentions and retrospective migration motivations 
might refer to diff erent things. While migration intentions might be more closely connected to the 
societal discourses, retrospective motivations might be related to migrants’ experience in the host 
country. Hence, I would say that using intentions is not a problem, if they are analysed as an indication 
of the host society and its mentalities.
Estonian society, migration, inequalities and value structure
According to data from Statistics Estonia, about 18000 people have left Estonia during the last three 
years. If we include the incoming migrants (many are return migrants), net migration is approximately 
9000. The high number of return migrants suggests that Estonia is experiencing much circular 
migration. According to the most conservative estimations, 1.5% of the total population has migrated 
during the last ten years (see Krusell, 2009). However, Hazans and Philips (2010) have noted that if 
commuters are taken into account, the number of potential migrants can go up to 4.5 % of the total 
population. When it comes to the portrait of an average Estonian migrant, Hazans and Philips (2010) 
have suggested that most migrants are young and with secondary education. Randveer & Rõõm (2013) 
add that males and blue-collar workers are most likely to move. This is supported by the fi ndings of 
Anniste, Tammaru, Pungas, and Paas (2012), which demonstrate that highly educated people are less 
likely to leave Estonia. For many people, the underlying objectives for migration are economic (see 
Krusell, 2009). Nevertheless, other causes, such as improving language skills and gaining new cultural 
experiences, are also becoming important. As Kõiva, Käsper, Elme and Murruste (2010) have indicated, 
cultural experiences and self-development purposes dominate, especially among the highly educated 
group. This is supported by research on other Eastern European countries, where an increase in self-
development related motives has been noticed. Jakobson, Kalev and Ruutsoo (2012) have identifi ed 
two main groups of Estonian migrants moving to Finland. The fi rst group consists of those with 
economic problems seeking better wages, and the second group comprises strategically recruited and 
highly skilled people, for whom that might have not been the fi rst migration experience. Still, most 
of the aforementioned studies are qualitative and a comprehensive study comparing diff erent socio-
economic groups in the society is yet to be carried out.
In order to formulate hypotheses about diff erent social groups and their migration motives, I 
will analyse both inequalities as well as value structure in Estonian society. In Estonia, the structural 
and economic reforms have been the most radical ones amongst the post-socialist CEE countries 
(Bohle & Greskovits, 2007). One result of privatisation and rapid market liberalisation was a sharp 
rise in social inequalities. The main losers in this process were those in lower occupational positions, 
especially those in the agrarian and manufacturing sectors. Due to the strong infl uence of neoliberal 
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ideology, the consequences of structural unemployment were often felt mainly by individuals, leading 
to a situation where many people internalised the message of being agents separated from social 
infl uences (Heinla, Tart, & Raudsepp, 2013; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2008). Woolfson (2009), Sippola (2013) 
and Lulle (2009) have argued that many individuals responded to neoliberal policies by ‘voting with 
their feet’ — migrating. Sommers and Woolfson (2014) have argued that especially after the economic 
crisis, Baltic States have experienced a new outfl ow of individuals, to whom they refer as the austeriat. 
The austeriat, mainly the young and unemployed, uses free mobility as a survival strategy. However, 
Sommers and Woolfson (2014) as well as Saar and Jakobson (2015) argue that more and more families 
are found among migrants. Still, it is somewhat unclear who exactly belongs to the austeriat group.
Vihalemm and Kalmus (2008) have argued that the Estonian value space has experienced 
considerable changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union. According to them, societal structures 
have been undermined and individual success is considered more important than the common good. 
According to Slater, consumer culture and its values are gaining ground in the country, and many 
people, especially among the younger generation, put great emphasis on material and social success. 
Saarniit (1998) has called this the process of individualistic pragmatisation of the Estonian value space. 
Nevertheless, such a process is most noticeable among those born in the 70s and the beginning of 
the 80s. For those born in the 90s, social and altruistic values are more important (see Rämmer, 
2009). Women as well as Estonian speakers tend to also have a more post-materialistic orientation. 
Furthermore, women and men also occupy diff erent economic sectors, women being overrepresented 
in education, health and social care, whereas men dominate in business and industry (Masso, 2010), 
which to some degree leads to diff erent values. In terms of migration, such value diff erences in 
the society might indicate varying motives. For instance, it is likely that men and Russian speakers 
would migrate more for economic reasons. Hence, it is important to consider not only the material 
conditions of diff erent socio-demographic groups, but also their value orientations.
As briefl y mentioned above, there are signifi cant diff erences between the values held by Russian 
(30% of the population) and Estonian speakers. The background for diff erent values, as well as the 
potentially diff ering migration motives, is the materially and politically deprived situation of many 
Russian speakers (see Saar, Lindemann, & Helemäe, 2009). Because of such deprivation they are more 
likely to value material success more, especially the members of the older generation (Vihalemm & 
Kalmus, 2008). According to Rämmer (2009), value diff erences in Estonian society do not follow ethnic 
lines, but rather generational ones. Furthermore, Aptekar (2010) has claimed that among Russian 
speakers moving from Latvia and Lithuania, material reasons dominate, but many Estonian Russians 
fl ee due to political discrimination.
Overall, it is important to note that both material conditions as well as particular values held by 
certain social groups can have an impact on their migration behaviour. On the one hand, Estonia 
provides a case that inspires some migrants to fl ee from its neoliberal conditions and policies. On the 
other hand, many people have internalised both neoliberal values as well as individual responsibility 
for their lives (see Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2006). In terms of migration, that means that there can be 
signifi cant diff erences in potential motives and attitudes.
Based on the previous, I formed the following hypotheses: 
First, as noted, Russian speakers tend to be in deprived situations in Estonian society and value 
material wellbeing more than Estonian speakers do. Estonian speakers, on the other hand, tend to 
aspire to high social positions and success. Therefore, I suggest:
1. Russian speakers intend to migrate more for fi nancial reasons, whereas Estonians tend to go 
because of the career potential. 
Second, as several scholars have suggested, women are more socially oriented when it comes to 
migration, whereas men are more materialistic and focus on success. Therefore, I suggest:
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2. Women intend to migrate more for social reasons, whereas men have fi nancial motives.
Third, based on theory, the highly skilled are seen more as being interested in career development, 
whereas the low skilled are motivated to migrate due to economic constraints. Also, as Kalmus and 
Vihalemm (2006) suggested, personal harmony seems to be more relevant to more highly educated 
people. Therefore, I propose:
3. People with lower education and occupational status intend to move more for fi nancial reasons 
than is the case for highly skilled people.
Fourth, I assume that since those who are married are less likely to migrate, they do so because of 
structural constraints such as unemployment or poverty.
4. Married people intend to move because of structural constraints such as an inability to fi nd a job 
or fi nancial diffi  culties.
Finally, as mentioned above, several scholars have suggested that younger people migrate for self-
development reasons and for career success, whereas older migrants move for economic reasons. 
However, Olofsson and Westin (2011) suggested that older people are more socially oriented, while 
Kalmus and Vihalemm (2006) claimed that younger people in Estonia are more materialistically 
oriented. Therefore, I would suggest: 
5. Older people intend to move more for social and life quality reasons, whereas younger people are 
motivated by career success and material benefi ts. 
Methodology
The data analysed in this study is based on an Estonian household module survey carried out in 2008 
and 2009. The survey included various questions on subjects ranging from one’s phone usage to trips to 
foreign countries. In this article, only one module of the survey, the one regarding migration motives, 
is used. The survey had 5596 respondents, of whom 620 said that they were considering migrating. 
(The exact question was: Do you plan to work in a foreign country in the next fi ve years?) First, logistic 
regression analysis was carried out based on migration intentions to get a better overview of the socio-
demographic characteristics of those who were planning to migrate. Those considering migration 
could choose between seven diff erent motivations: fi rst, better income; second, the possibility of 
improving language skills and experiencing another culture; third, better working conditions; fourth, 
better living conditions; fi fth, new experiences and professional development; sixth, family reasons; 
and seventh, lack of jobs in their profession in Estonia. These motivations were coded as binary 
in the data fi le. Based on the answers to the question about motivations, I formed three groups 
using K-means cluster analysis (the description of the groups is in the empirical part of the study). 
Second, I performed multivariate logistic regression analysis, which allowed me to analyse how socio-
demographic variables infl uence migration motivations and also to see the infl uences of the variables. 
I included six diff erent variables: gender, occupational status, family status, language, education and 
age. Regression analysis was executed in four stages, resulting in four models. In the fi rst model, 
I included gender, age and language as demographic variables; in the second stage education was 
added; in the third, occupational status; and, fi nally, family status. I will now describe some of the 
variables in more detail. 
Based on education, people were divided into fi ve groups: those with elementary and basic 
education, those with vocational education, those with secondary education, those with secondary 
specialised education and, fi nally, those with higher education. Labour market status was distinguished 
as follows: students or those temporarily at home (both have the intention to return to the labour 
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market and, therefore, diff er from the unemployed); managers and professionals; semi-professionals 
and clerks; service workers; skilled and unskilled workers (a lot of cases will be in de-skilled positions 
in the foreign country because there are problems with recognising qualifi cations inside EU); and 
the unemployed. Based on language, people were separated into those whose primary language was 
Estonian and others (primarily Russian speakers). Age groups were: 15-19; 20-29; 30-39; 40-49 and 50-59 
(I excluded older people from the analysis, since there were so few). Finally, in family status, married, 
cohabiting, single and divorced were included. 
Results
First, I will describe the group that intended to migrate based on the abovementioned six variables. As 
we can see from Table 1, males are more likely to want to move than females. Based on the age group, 
younger people are more prone to migrate than the oldest age group. People whose mother tongue 
is diff erent from Estonian are also more likely to become potential migrants. Surprisingly, education 
does not have a strong infl uence on people’s migration intentions; only people with basic education 
are less likely to have an intention of moving compared to those with higher education. Compared 
to unemployed people, almost all other groups are less likely to consider moving. Only those in blue-
collar jobs are as likely to become potential migrants. Finally, single people are more likely to consider 
moving than all other family status groups. 
Table 1: Regression analysis — migration intentions based on socio-demographic variables (B regression 
coeffi  cients)
Migration intentions (reference group does not want to migrate)
Gender Females (reference group)
males 0.41***
Age group 50-59 (reference group)
15-19 2.31***
20-29 1.68***
30-39 1.25***
40-49 0.91***
Language Other (reference group)
Estonian –0.45***
Education Higher (reference group)
Basic –0.425*
Secondary –0.02
Secondary specialised –0.22
Labour market 
status
Unemployed (reference group)
Students/house –0.59**
Managers/professionals –0.51**
Semi-professionals/clerks –0.74**
Service workers –0.45*
Skilled and unskilled workers –0.24
Family status Single (reference group)
Married –1.15***
Cohabiting –0.83***
Divorced –0.55**
Nagelkerke’s R Square 0.21
Source: author’s calculations based on Household Module Survey 2008
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Second, I will analyse the motivations for migration and their popularity. However, before going 
to my analysis I would like to make a short comment on the diff erences between the motives of 
those who intend to migrate and those who have migrated. As my data also included people who 
have carried out their migration plan, a separate group not included in this analysis, I can say that 
the diff erence between the reasons for migrating and intending to migrate were not great. The most 
signifi cant diff erence was that those who had migrated regarded the improvement of living and 
working conditions as more important factors for moving than was the case with those intending 
to move. The explanation for this may be that these factors might have become important only 
afterwards, but might also be related to the specifi cs of the group that returned after migration. 
Although there is a gap between those who carry out migration and those who solely intend to 
migrate, at least according to my data the diff erences in motivations for migration between these 
groups are not big. Table 2 illustrates all the reasons that were considered important for migration by 
respondents — this means that one person could choose more than one reason for migrating. As can 
be seen from the Table 2, better income was the most important reason for those people who were 
planning to migrate, 92% considered it signifi cant. Also, professional development and the benefi ts of 
being exposed to other cultural and linguistic environments were vital as migration motives. Family 
reasons proved to be the least signifi cant for people intending to migrate (10%), followed by the lack 
of professional opportunities. 
Based on the migration incentives, I distinguished three diff erent clusters (see Table 2). I chose to 
use three cluster versions because in this case the diff erences between the groups were notable and 
also each group was big enough to be representable. Respondents could choose whether the reason 
was important for migrating or not. The fi rst cluster can be characterised as consisting of people 
whose main incentives for migrating are economic. Other reasons are less signifi cant, although maybe 
it is worth noting that given the small number of people for whom a lack of professional opportunities 
Table 2: The popularity of migration motives, %
Motivations for migration Agree
Better income 91.6
New experiences/professional development 84.0
Improvement of language skills/cultural experience 79.7
Better living conditions 54.1
Better working conditions 28.4 
Lack of professional opportunities 21.5
Family reasons 10.3
Source: author’s calculations based on Household Module Survey 2008
Table 3: Three clusters based on migration motives
Motivations for migration 
Economic 
migrants
Life quality 
migrants
Self-development 
migrants
Better Income 1.96 1.96 1.84
Improvement of language skills/cultural experience 1.00 1.97 2.00
Better living conditions 1.46 2.00 1.00
Better working conditions 1.22 1.47 1.08
New experiences/professional development 1.48 1.94 1.91
Family reasons 1.11 1.13 1.07
Lack of professional opportunities 1.38 1.21 1.11
Note: scale: 1—not important; 2—important
Source: author’s calculations based on Household Module Survey 2008
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was a push factor it proved to be more important for the fi rst cluster. The fi rst cluster then can be 
called ‘potential economic migrants’. In the second cluster, people regard several benefi ts, such as 
better income and living conditions, professional development and language skill improvement as 
relevant. They can, therefore, be termed ‘potential life quality migrants’, taking into consideration 
multiple aspects of the environment, not only economic gains. Criticism of local politics could also 
be behind this group’s motivations, as they ‘vote with their feet’ (see Lulle, 2010). In the third group, 
improved language skills and professional development are seen as most signifi cant. Unlike for the 
two other groups, income is less relevant as a reason for migrating. Also, better living conditions 
appear totally irrelevant in making a decision. Hence, I have decided to call this group the ‘potential 
self-development migrants’ (for ease of reading I will subsequently leave ‘potential’ out of the names 
of the clusters). In the following, I will briefl y describe the average person belonging to each cluster. 
Among economic migrants there were more people from Eastern Estonia, speaking mainly 
a language other than Estonian (primarily Russian). Those people were older than the average 
respondent and were likely to have a family. There were more men than women and more blue-collar 
workers than members of any other occupational group among potential economic migrants. The 
unemployed were overrepresented as well. A big share of life quality migrants were working in service. 
In terms of the location, Central and Western Estonia were dominant (rural areas with sometimes 
higher unemployment). The average respondent belonging to this group was rather young (20-29) and 
single. Finally, self-development migrants had higher professional status (managers, professionals). 
Women and Estonians were overrepresented. Also, members of the youngest age group (15-19) were 
more likely to belong to this cluster.
Next, I will discuss the results of the regression analysis. As a reference group, I chose self-develop-
ment migrants since this group diff ered more from the two others. Between the two other groups, the 
diff erences in terms of socio-economic variables were not as big and statistically signifi cant. 
The impact of gender proved to be signifi cant in all four models. Males were more likely to become 
economic migrants than self-development migrants compared to females, whereas there were no 
gender diff erences in the odds of becoming a life quality migrant. This means that material motives 
were more important for men, whereas for women, self-improvement was seen as a signifi cant reason 
for migrating. To a certain degree, this follows my earlier hypothesis where I claimed that men are 
more likely to be motivated by the material gains of migration. Still, it is also important to note that 
there were no diff erences in belonging to the second cluster in comparison with the third, meaning 
that women were less likely to be migrating for social reasons than for self-development purposes, 
which somewhat challenges my hypothesis. There are many explanations for such diff erentiation 
based on gender. First, men and women have distinct occupations in Estonian society. Since my 
statistical data also included information on the economic sector of work, I also checked for the 
infl uence of gender when adding this variable to the model. It appeared that the infl uence of gender 
decreased signifi cantly when adding in the economic sector. Indeed in certain fi elds, migrating for 
self-development reasons was more likely than in others. A second possible explanation for the 
diff erences between the motives is the dominance of gender roles in Estonian society, where men 
are expected to be the income earners, whereas women, especially younger women, seem to favour 
the idea of lifelong learning. Also, some women might feel that due to the dominant gender roles 
in Estonian society, their professional growth is limited and they might consider moving for career 
advancement reasons. One should also diff erentiate between what is considered as a valid explanation 
for migrating and what is behind the actual motives. In that case, my results do not state that men 
are less interested in self-development, but they might just show that it is less socially acceptable for 
them to declare their interest in this area, compared to being economically successful. 
When it comes to age, younger people were less likely to become economic migrants than 
self-development migrants compared to the oldest age group. However, there were no signifi cant 
diff erences in the odds of becoming a life quality migrant. Still, when adding family status to the 
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Table 4: Multinomial regression analysis — the likelihood of belonging to the clusters based on socio-
demographic variables (B regression coeffi  cients)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Economic migrants (self-development migrants base outcome)
Gender Females (reference group)
males 1.032*** 0.965*** 0.934*** 0.960***
Age group 50-59 (reference group)
15-19 –1.615*** –2.337*** –2.285*** –2.700***
20-29 –1.219** –1.329** –1.313** –1.734**
30-39 –0.412 –0.520 –0.486 –0.848
40-49 –0.149 –0.248 –0.397 –0.614
Language Other (reference group)
Estonian –1.614*** –1.704*** –1.550*** –1.575***
Education Higher (reference group)
Basic 1.546*** 1.044* 0.937
Vocational 0.955* 0.453 0.520
Secondary 0.824* 0.605 0.431
Secondary specialised 0.941* 0.540 0.512
Labour market 
status
Unemployed (reference group)
Students/house –0.939* –1.033*
Managers/professionals –1.453** –1.611***
Semi-professionals/clerks –1.446* –1.481*
Service workers –0.944* –1.065**
Skilled and unskilled workers –0.847 –0.919
Family status Single (reference group)
Married –0.270
Cohabiting 0.099
Divorced –1.679**
Life quality migrants (self-development migrants base outcome)
Gender Females (reference group)
Males –0.029 –0.081 –0.082 –0.085
Age group 50-59 (reference group)
15-19 –0.403 –0.742 –0.539 –1.396**
20-29 0.178 0.06 0.177 –0.552
30-39 –0.130 –0.175 –0.202 –0.573
40-49 –0.270 –0.362 –0.461 –0.749
Language Other (reference group)
Estonian –0.635*** –0.662*** –0.594** –0.662***
Education Higher (reference group)
Basic 0.995*** 0.602 0.535
Vocational 0.984** 0.454* 0.399
Secondary 0.887*** 0.701 0.598
Secondary specialised 0.855** 0.582 0.423
Labour market 
status
Unemployed (reference group)
Students/house –0.670 –0.657
Managers/professionals –1.181** –1.116**
Semi-professionals/clerks –0.166 –0.116
Service workers –0.315 –0.191
Skilled and unskilled workers –0.209 –0.094
Family status Single (reference group)
Married –0.758*
Cohabiting –0.615*
Divorced –0.863
Nagelkerke’s R-Square 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.24
*p<0.10. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on Household Module Survey 2008
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model, the youngest group was less likely than the age group 50-59 to become life quality migrants, 
compared to becoming self-development migrants. The latter group fi ts my hypothesis, where I stress 
that older people should be more interested in improving their life quality. However, contrary to this 
hypothesis, economic motives proved to be less important to the youngest compared to the eldest. A 
possible explanation may be the strong prevalence of the neoliberal discourse that stresses individual 
development and career success, which makes the younger people put a high value on these factors. 
In addition to this, many younger people might be interested in migrating for study purposes and then 
later decide to stay for work. This, therefore, makes fi nancial reasons irrelevant and puts stress on new 
experiences and self-exploration. However, this does not mean that fi nancial motives are irrelevant 
in the long run since good educational credentials or excellent language knowledge can increase the 
chances of success in the labour market, both in the homeland as well as in the host country. 
Estonian speakers are less likely to become economic and life quality migrants than self-development 
migrants, compared to the Russian speakers. This also fi ts my hypothesis, in which I stressed that 
Russian speakers are probably more motivated by economic gains due to their deprived situation in 
Estonian society. However, it was somewhat surprising that migrating for self-development is also a 
more important motive for Estonian speakers than life quality reasons, compared to Russian speakers. 
One could assume that being economically deprived and working in low status jobs, Russian speakers 
would also feel that their life quality was suff ering and that it could be enhanced by moving away. 
Seeing migration as a means to improve life quality could indicate discrimination in Estonian society. 
Also, coming from the lower social positions, Russian speakers might see their migration more as a 
response to structural constraints, rather than a free choice shaping their own individual life path. 
Finally, when it comes to the value structure of Estonian speakers, they put great stress on achieving 
success and a high position in society. Migration for self-development purposes might, therefore, be 
seen as a means of obtaining a higher position. 
According to model 2, all educational groups except the more highly educated are more likely 
to become economic migrants than self-development migrants. However, when we add the labour 
market situation to the model, the eff ect of education diminishes. This means that education mainly 
has an infl uence through the labour market situation. Therefore, we can say that when it comes to 
migration intentions, the labour market position plays a key role. The reason why migration intentions 
are connected to occupational status might be merely due to practical considerations, meaning for 
instance those working in blue-collar jobs might intend to move for economic reasons more than 
others because they would experience the greatest increase in salary. Still, those with basic education 
are more likely to become economic migrants than self-development migrants compared to those with 
higher education, whereas those with vocational education have higher odds of becoming life quality 
migrants than self-development migrants compared to the higher educated. The second phenomenon 
might be explained by people with vocational education perceiving their working environment as bad 
in Estonia and seeing more advancement in this respect when moving abroad, than those with higher 
education. 
All other groups apart from blue-collar workers are less likely to migrate due to economic motives 
than for self-development reasons, compared to the unemployed. This is quite logical taking into 
consideration that economic troubles can be relevant for the unemployed, especially considering very 
low unemployment benefi ts in Estonia (approximately 100 euros a month). Similarly, blue-collars might 
imagine their life in terms of lacking material necessities rather than as a project of self-development. 
Moreover, for them the fi nancial gains might be the highest. Professionals and managers also have 
lower odds of becoming life quality migrants than self-development migrants, when compared to the 
unemployed. This might stem from the fact that their living and working conditions as well as life 
quality are already comparatively good in Estonia. Therefore, they perceive professional development 
as a valid reason for migrating. In addition, lower educated people might expect to advance less 
professionally by moving than those with high skills. Therefore, their experiences in foreign countries 
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might not be that relevant for their CV. When adding the impact of the family status to the model, 
managers, professionals and service workers are even less likely to become economic migrants than 
self-development migrants in comparison to the unemployed. 
Finally, cohabiting or married persons are less likely to belong to the life quality migrants group 
than self-development migrants compared to those living alone. This is a somewhat interesting result 
and a potential explanation could be that the perception of life quality might be infl uenced by both 
the double income as well as having a partner. If people with a partner evaluate their life quality as 
higher than those who are single, it is only natural that this is not important as a reason for migrating. 
Second, those who are divorced are less likely to become economic migrants than self-development 
migrants compared to those who are single. This is also a somewhat unexpected and interesting 
result. One possible explanation could be that those having overcome divorce become more conscious 
about shaping their lives and developing themselves, and they want to take a more proactive role in 
this through migration. In addition, recreating one’s identity and establishing a new system of values 
is easier abroad, so migration and the recovery process from an important life event might go hand 
in hand in this case. 
Conclusion
The main objective of this article was to test the alleged individualisation of Eastern European 
migration. Several studies have noted that Eastern European migrants are more oriented towards 
self-development and their migration motives have become individualised. This article, however, has 
demonstrated the opposite. By checking for the impact of socio-demographic variables on migration 
motives, the article found that there were signifi cant diff erences between various social groups. The 
article has distinguished between three kinds of migrants: self-development migrants, economic 
migrants and life quality migrants. The results show that self-development migrants are likely to be 
young, highly educated, female, Estonian speakers and divorced. This is concurrent with the qualitative 
studies on Eastern European migration, which claim the new mobility patterns to be characteristic of 
the young and highly educated. However, these results also bring out the impact of gender roles as well 
as ethnicity and marital status, which have so far received very limited attention. The second group, 
economic migrants, are more likely to be older, blue-collar, Russian speakers and male. This confi rms 
the assumptions that younger people in Eastern Europe are increasingly inspired by post-materialist 
values, whereas the older generation still holds on to materialist values. However, the diff erences can 
also be explained by the increasing responsibilities related to aging, such as taking care of the family 
and relatives. Finally, life quality migrants are more likely to be either cohabiting or married, and in 
terms of most other variables stand between economic and self-development migrants. These results 
indicate that life quality migrants might move with their family for the purpose of improving the 
family livelihood. 
Even though one can see some signs of new mobility patterns in the studied population, these 
relate to a very specifi c population. The group of self-development migrants is smaller than the two 
other groups and includes mainly young, highly skilled females. Many qualitative studies have indeed 
argued that it is the young and highly skilled who are more likely to have other motivations than 
economic concerns. However, this has not yet been checked quantitatively. Furthermore, rather little 
attention is given to the fact that there is a contradiction in claiming that migration from Eastern 
European countries has become individualised, while also suggesting that these individualised 
patterns characterise mainly the young and highly skilled. Whereas it might be true that the young 
and highly skilled see their life plans as a result of individualised refl ection, they are by no means 
acting independently of their social surroundings. Hence, it would be useful to distinguish between 
individualisation on a discursive level and individualisation in an individual’s behaviour. 
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To continue, few migration studies have paid attention to the increasing inequalities in Eastern 
European societies. On one hand, there is a group consisting of young, highly skilled people that have 
many opportunities, and for whom migration is mainly an act of liberation. On the other hand, there 
is an aging, socio-economically challenged group that migrates mostly for economic reasons and for 
whom moving is not desirable. Such results point out the societal inequalities where the young and 
highly educated can aff ord to view migration as a self-development strategy, whereas for the elderly it 
is a survival mechanism (see also Saar & Jakobson, 2015). There is also a third group, which is family-
centred and values social security and is, therefore, attentive to a wide range of conditions infl uencing 
life quality. This group is most likely more versatile, which is also refl ected in the results, as it had very 
few strong correlations with socio-demographic variables. According to Saar and Jakobson (2015), this 
group probably includes people ranging from struggling single parents to wealthy couples. 
The infl uence of socio-demographic variables can be partly explained by the emergence of class 
society in many Eastern European countries and the increase of material inequalities, but also by 
the value changes in these societies. Several Eastern European countries have seen a rapid increase 
in social disparities. However, such inequalities often run along socio-demographic lines, due to the 
advantages that were present for the younger, Estonian-speaking male population in the nineties. It 
is also important to note, according to Sippola (2013), that as a result of neoliberal policies, managing 
was put on the shoulders of individuals for whom migration becomes one potential solution. Hence, 
although mostly overlooked, neoliberalist policies in Eastern European societies have had a great 
eff ect on migration fl ows. However, this is not the complete picture as the value structure in these 
societies is also a potential explanation for the diff erence between migration intentions. Whereas 
the older generation, males and Russian speakers are more materialistically oriented, younger, highly 
skilled people have adopted post-materialist values. Hence, there is a strong connection between 
values and socio-economic wellbeing, which is refl ected in migration patterns. Currently there are 
many contradictory claims about Eastern European migration, starting from Woolfson’s rather dark 
vision of Baltic migrants belonging to the austeriat, and ending with Kring et al.’s (2013) much more 
positive tone about the empowerment and experimentation of Polish migrants in the UK. If we were 
to analyse the background of the studied migrants more carefully, we could produce a more detailed 
picture of Eastern European migration fl ows.
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